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PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND THE PERILS OF
CATEGORICAL THINKING: LESSONS FROM
LAMB'S CHAPEL
ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE*

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the intersection of the Religion and Speech Clauses
of the First Amendment' has become increasingly controversial particularly
in the context of public schooling. Religious group meetings, the distribution of religious literature, the discussion of religious themes, and the
recitation of prayers at graduation ceremonies have all forced the courts
to weigh and re-weigh the right to individual speech against the responsibility of the state to stay within the bounds of Establishment Clause
doctrine. Several legal and political factors have fueled this debate.
Although the Supreme Court has reaffirmed on several occasions the
2
unconstitutionality of organized prayer in the schools, the question of
other forms of religious speech remains open. In addition, the Court's
shift since the early 1980s toward greater religious accommodation, together with a nationwide swing toward political conservatism, have created
a more comfortable climate in which both students and non-students
have asserted the right to use public school facilities for the exercise of
religious speech.' Passionate religion and speech claims have generated

* Associate Academic Dean and Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, New
York. The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Faculty Research Program
at St. John's University. The author wishes to acknowledge Deborah Hewitt who served as research
assistant on this project.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
The first two, the Religion Clauses, are commonly referred to as the
freedom of speech ....
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses respectively. The last is referred to as the Speech Clause.
2. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding the recitation of a prayer composed by
the New York Board of Regents as violating the Establishment Clause); Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional Bible reading and the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down as unconstitutional a state statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for meditation or
voluntary prayer); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional the inclusion
of invocations and benedictions in the form of prayer at graduation ceremony of public school).
3. Between September 1992 and August 1993, there were a total of 247 incidents of churchstate conflicts in the states, up from 196 the previous year. Of these, there were 111 incidents in
38 states related to religion in the schools, 46 incidents in 31 states concerning free exercise disputes,
47 incidents in 28 states regarding public funding of religious organizations, and 43 incidents in 30
states related to state endorsement of religion. AMIucANs UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT ON CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1993).
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local political controversy, defied administrative resolution, and have
found their way into the federal courts.4
In addressing these religion and speech claims, courts have wound
through a maze of First Amendment doctrine over the past two decades
against the backdrop of a Supreme Court in ideological flux. The Religion
and Free Speech Clauses have generated sharp interpretive disagreements
among Supreme Court Justices. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
question of religious speech has proven particularly problematic, setting
the First Amendment on an internal collision course. During the 1992
Supreme Court term, the case of Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District5 challenged the Justices to develop coherent
theories of both Establishment Clause and Free Speech interpretation.
6
Unfortunately, the Court failed on both counts.
In Lamb's Chapel, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the right of
an outside religious group to use public school facilities after school

4. See, e.g., infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text; see also Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp.
1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991), appeal dismissed, 972 F.2d 1331 (1992) (upholding teacher's refusal to permit
fifth grade student to distribute survey asking students about their views on God as well as oral
presentation on God); DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools, 799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(upholding school's restriction on student's showing videotape of herself singing and proselytizing
religious song to second grade class during show and tell). The issue of graduation prayers has
recently attracted national attention and caused turmoil in school districts across the country. The
debate has escalated since the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) (holding that a public school's inclusion of "nonsectarian" prayer in a school graduation
ceremony constituted an impermissible establishment of religion under the Establishment Clause),
together with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. School Dist., 977 F.2d
963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993) (upholding a policy permitting high school
seniors to choose student volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations at graduation
ceremonies). Following Weisman, the American Center for Law and Justice, a Washington-based
public interest law firm founded by the evangelical minister Pat Robertson, sent letters to 15,000
school districts and 300,000 "concerned citizens" informing them of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Jones and the group's understanding that Weisman does not prohibit students from "initiating and
leading prayer" at commencement exercises. The American Civil Liberties Union countered with a
mailing to 15,000 school superintendents, informing them that Jones is unconstitutional in that the
decision permits a student election on the prayer issue, allows school officials to approve the prayer,
and designates a time for it during official ceremonies. According to the ACLU, students may
organize prayer ceremonies before and after graduation programs only if the prayers are voluntary,
organized without the input of school authorities, and held off the school grounds. Henry J. Reske,
Graduation Prayers, Part II, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 14, 16. Appearing on the June 8, 1993
edition of Pat Robertson's "700 Club" following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the
Jones case, the American Center for Law and Justice Chief Counsel inaccurately referred to the
Court's action as an "affirmance" and further asserted that the action opened the door to organized
school prayer and religious testimonials by students. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State countered with a mailing to 50 state education departments, similar to the ACLU statement,
clarifying the importance of Lee v. Weisman, the dangers of "endorsement" that flow from the
Jones decision, and the significance of a denial of certiorari as not an affirmance of a lower court
decision. GRADUATION PRAYER UPDATE (Americans United for Separation of Church and State),
July 1993.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
6. At least three other circuits had upheld a First Amendment right to. equal access under
policies that were of comparable or even narrower scope than the state statute in question in Lamb's
Chapel. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Concerned Women for America v.
Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989); Gregoire v. Centennial School Dist., 907 F.2d 1366
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 253 (1990); Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine School
Admin. Dist. #5, 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991).
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hours where school officials had previously granted access to similar
speakers and subjects. From a doctrinal perspective, the Court achieved
consensus at the cost of specificity and clarity. Lamb's Chapel, in fact,
may be remembered better for what the Court failed to say than for
what the opinion actually said. The thin reasoning of Justice White's
majority opinion, an unsatisfactory attempt to finesse the Establishment
Clause issue, and the analytic leaps and gaps in the Court's discussion
of the Free Speech Clause all combine in a troublesome decision that
generates more questions than answers.
This commentary focuses on the speech aspects of Lamb's Chapel.
The decision appears, at first glance, to represent a victory for religious
speech but that victory is narrowed by the Court's reliance on the public
forum doctrine, 7 a doctrine which utilizes a categorical approach that
carries broad implications for religious and non-religious expressive rights
in schools. In addition, the commentary addresses the development of
the public forum doctrine through a discussion of modern case law and
the shortcomings of public forum analysis as viewed through the lens
of Lamb's Chapel and other recent school-related cases. Finally, an
alternative theoretical framework at the end of this commentary builds
on a contextual approach that appears to have gained increasing support
among the Supreme Court Justices.
LAMB'S CHAPEL: THE LOWER COURTS' VIEW
In 1988, a pastor of an evangelical Christian Church sought permission
to use the Center Moriches High School auditorium to show a film series
entitled "Turn Your Heart Toward Home" featuring James Dobson,
president of a group called Focus on the Family. The series would be
offered to the general public once per week over a five-week period in
the evening, free of charge. The stated purpose of the series was "to
8
share some practical insights about the family." The school district
denied Mr. Dobson's request, relying on a state law that permits local
school boards to open public school facilities to the community for certain
enumerated uses including "social, civic and recreational meetings and
entertainments and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community." 9 The statute makes no mention of religious uses of public school

7. Public forum doctrine is a framework developed by the Supreme Court for analyzing the
permissibility of speech on public property as weighed against government's interest in limiting the
use of its property. The doctrine divides government property into three categories: the traditional
public forum, the designated or limited public forum, and the non-public forum. The degree of
permissible government restrictions on speech is measured by the character, i.e., the category of
the forum in question. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
8. In the film, Dr. Dobson, an expert on family life, "reminds parents of society's slide toward
humanism-the undermining influences of radio, television, films, and the press-which can only
be counterbalanced by a loving home where Christian values are instilled from an early age." 959
F.2d 381, 384 (2nd Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
9. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414(l)(a-j) (McKinney 1992) sets out ten purposes for which the use of
school facilities may be granted throughout the State including "social, civic and recreational
meetings."
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facilities. The district also relied on its own local rules which make
physical facilities available during non-school hours, for "social, civic,
recreational and other activities" by members of the community, but
provide that "school premises shall not be used by any group for religious
purposes."' 0 The district, in fact, opened its doors on prior occasions
to a broad range of uses, some appearing to be religion-related, including
a Salvation Army Band benefit concert with invocation and religious
music, a gospel music concert with religious songs and hymns, and a
lecture series entitled "Psychology and the Unknown" that included Hindu
concepts and "spiritual effusion."" The school district never denied the
use of its facilities to outside groups prior to its denial of the Lamb's
Chapel application.
In 1990, the Church brought suit in federal court against the school
district, raising among other constitutional claims that its freedom of
speech under the First Amendment had been violated. 12 Church officials
argued that the school district had opened the facilities for use by the
general public. The exclusion of religious speech, therefore, under prevailing public forum doctrine, could only be enforced if the exclusion
met the same standards that apply in a traditional public forum where
content-based restrictions must be "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest" and must be "narrowly drawn" to serve that purpose." The
school district on the other hand, denied that it had created an open
forum and further claimed that it had a "compelling interest" in protecting
elementary and secondary students from proselytizing religious ideas of
various religious groups and entities. Without a compelling interest, the
school district's action would violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.
'4 The district court granted summary judgment for the
5
school district.1
Lamb's Chapel appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals which affirmed the entry of summary judgment
against the Church. 6 The court of appeals' decision discussed the public
forum doctrine as well as arguments advanced by both sides concerning

10. Rules and Regulations for Community Use of School Facilities, Nos. 7, 10, as cited in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2144 (1993).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146 n.5 (1993).
12. The Church challenged the denial as a violation of the Free Speech and Assembly Clauses,
the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Providing legal representation were lawyers
from" the Center for Law and Justice, see supra note 4.
13. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). The
previous year, the district court had denied Lamb's Chapel's motion for preliminary injunction.
736 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). The Church initially appealed the denial to the Second Circuit
but subsequently withdrew the appeal and returned to the district court to allow the court to
reconsider the case in light of Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (granting equal access to high school student religious groups under the federal
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988)).
16. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
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the applicability of § 414 of the New York Education Law" and the
school district's Local Rule No. 7.18 The court concluded that "the school
property in question falls within the subcategory of 'limited public forum',
the classification that allows it to remain non-public except as to specified

uses."' 19 Although the court admitted that whether the school district had
opened its facilities to religious uses and purposes presented a close
question, it held that "none of the prior uses pointed to by the appellants
Incidental references to religion or
were for religious purposes ....
religious figures, the occasional use of religious terms, and the performance

of music with religious overtones do not convert a secular program into
a religious one."

20

In other words, the school district could permissibly

create a religion-free forum for private speakers on school property as
long as it consistently excluded all such speakers.
The court distinguished the facts of Lamb's Chapel from prior case
law relied upon by the appellants. In Widmar v. Vincent, 21 the Supreme
Court held that a state university could not deny access to university
facilities to students conducting religious meetings on campus where access
had been granted to other student groups. In Board of Education of the
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,22 the Court held that a high
school created a limited open forum by allowing non-curriculum related
groups to use the school facilities and therefore could not deny access
to students for religious group meetings without violating the federal
Equal Access Act. 23 According to the appeals panel, "Widmar involved
the use of university property by student groups in a situation where a
number of such groups had been afforded access, to the point where,
24 The court
as to the students, a 'generally open forum' was created."
found that Mergens, on the other hand, was decided "purely on statutory

17. Supra note 9.
18. Supra note 10. The appeals court held that religious uses were nowhere permitted in the
enumeration of ten permissible uses under state law, that all the uses specified were subject to local
school board regulation, and that Center Moriches had prohibited religious uses under Local Rule
No. 7. Relying on prior case law, the court concluded that the "use of New York school facilities
is confined to non-religious purposes and thereby ascertained the state's intent to create a limited
public forum .... " 959 F.2d at 387 (citation omitted) (citing Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v.
Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1988) [Deeper Life I]). However, even in a limited public
forum where "government is free to impose a blanket exclusion on certain types of speech," the
court held, "once it allows expressive speech activities of a certain genre, it may not selectively
deny access for other activities." Id. at 387 (citing Travis v. Owego-Appalachian School Dist., 927
F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991)). The only remaining question was whether "Center Moriches has
opened its facilities to religious uses and purposes." Id. at 387.
19. 959 F.2d at 386.
20. Id. at 388.
21. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The exclusion was based on a regulation adopted in 1972 by the
University of Missouri at Kansas City that prohibited the use of "University buildings or grounds
... for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching." Id. at 265 n.3.
22. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
23. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988). The Act states: It shall be unlawful for any public secondary
school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content
of the speech at such meetings.
24. 959 F.2d at 388-89 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)).
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grounds. ' 2 In both cases, "religious use of the property was sought by
students, who have a greater claim on the use of school property than
outsiders, especially when the property generally is open to student
groups." 2 6 Classifying the property as a non-public forum, the Church's
requested use of the school facility in Lamb's Chapel could be denied
as long as the denial was "reasonable" and viewpoint neutral.
The court of appeals in Lamb's Chapel apparently assumed the reasonableness of the school district's decision without suggesting any governmental interest. The court did not even address the issue of viewpoint
neutrality. Its distinction between religious and non-religious speech was
based on content-discrimination in the context of the limited public forum
rather than on religion as a perspective or point of view on otherwise
eligible subject matter. Nor did the court explain why, in the context of
"religion as subject matter," the film series in question was not of the
same "genre" as social, civic, recreational, or other permitted uses.
THE SUPREME COURT TURNAROUND
Lamb's Chapel subsequently petitioned and was granted review by the
United States Supreme Court. The United States Department of Justice
filed a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the Church. The American
Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way and the Union
of American Hebrew Congregations joined Americans United for Separation of Church and State in a second brief. 27 Americans United here
broke rank from other separationist groups, including the Anti-Defamation
League and the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
(PEARL), which joined an amicus brief written by the New York State
and National School Boards Associations in support of the school district.
The Supreme Court, in addressing Lamb's Chapel's claim, took the
interpretive path of least resistance. The scope and reasoning of Justice
White's majority opinion stands in stark contrast to that of the appeals
court. The appeals court had concluded that the school district had
created a "limited public forum" open only for designated purposes, a
"classification that allows it to remain non-public except as to specified
uses. "28 Religious uses were not among those permitted as evidenced by
district policy and practice and, therefore, the court had applied the
reasonableness standard governing the non-public forum. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, avoided any discussion of the limited public
forum and leap-frogged into a non-public forum analysis. Unlike the
appeals court, however, which found the Local Rule No. 7 prohibition

25. Id. at 389.
26. Id.
27. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, New York Civil Liberties Union, People for the American Way, and Union
of American Hebrew Congregations, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
(No. 91-2024), 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). Americans United for Separation of Church and State
typically takes a far stricter stand on church-state separation than their position in Lamb's Chapel.
28. 959 F.2d at 386.
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against religious speech to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral on its
face, the Justices failed to address the facial validity of a blanket pro-29
hibition on religious speech, opting instead for an "as applied" approach.
Beyond the fundamental analytic distinctions between the appeals court
and Supreme Court opinions, the Supreme Court worked its way to a
different result essentially by focusing on the appropriate label to be
attached to the ban on religious speech as embodied in Local Rule No.
7. Was the appeals court correct in concluding that this was subjectmatter discrimination, permissible within the designated public forum as
long as it was consistently applied to all religious speech? Or was this
discrimination based on a particular point of view, here a religious one,
and impermissible even in the non-public forum? The answer to this
question lay in the interpretation of the facts of the case. In Lamb's
Chapel, the Court concluded that the film series on child rearing and
family values "dealt with a subject otherwise permissible under Rule 10,"
which allowed the school property to be used for "social or civic purposes." 30
The appeals court had concluded that prior permitted uses of the school
property did not fall under the topic or subject of religion and the school
district, by practice, had not established religion as a permissible subject
for purposes of access to the forum. The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, viewed the critical subject as one of family issues and child-rearing,
characterizing religion as a particular point of view on an otherwise
permissible topic.
The Court held that the district had permitted at least one other use
of a similar character, 3 and concluded that the "exhibition was denied
solely because the film dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint. "32 In other words, this situation was not discrimination based on
subject matter or speaker identity which is permissible in the non-public
forum, but rather discrimination against a viewpoint that comes from a
religious perspective. 3 Since viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even
in the non-public forum, the Court did not have to reach the question
whether the district had created a limited or designated forum in this
case as the lower courts had done.
The Court then debated the school district's main defense; to permit
school property to be used for religious purposes would constitute an
29. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 n.6
(1993).
30. Id. at 2147. The Court found "particularly interesting and relevant to the issue" the first
item on a sample list of uses permitted under Rule 10 in 1987 and 1988, i.e., "a lecture series by
the Mind Center, purportedly a New Age religious group." Id. at 2146 n.5 (quoting Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). As described
by the Court of Appeals, "the lecture series, 'Psychology and the Unknown,' by Jerry Huck ...
a psychotherapist ... discussed such topics as parapsychology, transpersonal psychology, physics
and metaphysics." Id. (quoting Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 388).
31. Id. at 2147.
32. Id.
33. Between 1987 and 1990, at least 80 different groups had engaged in a total of over 955
uses of the school facilities. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Dist., (No. 91-2024), 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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establishment of religion violative of the First Amendment.14 Although

it is not the intent of this commentary to address this issue in detail,
the Court's failure to provide a thoroughly reasoned analysis on the First
Amendment issue is important to note. Why did the majority avoid a
more affirmative application of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test"
which has garnered some support among the Court members over the
past decade? 35 While the majority drew support from Widmar, it is
unclear why it failed to elaborate on the dangers of endorsement which
were more severe in Widmar or why Justice White failed to distinguish
his position here from that taken in Widmar.36 In Widmar, university
facilities were used by students, arguably for religious worship during
university operating hours (including "prayer, hymns, Bible commentary,

and discussion of religious views and experiences") 37 as compared with

Lamb's Chapel where the school premises would be used after school
hours by outsiders for a showing of a film without any aura of direct
government involvement. It is perplexing why Justice White framed his
majority opinion using the language of "endorsement" when he seems

34. Here the Court, relying on Widmar, concluded that there would have been "no realistic
danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular
creed." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. "The showing of this film would not have been during
school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the
public, not just to church members." Id. The majority resurrected the "three-part test articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971): The challenged governmental action has a secular
purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion." Id. In a caustic separate opinion, Justice Scalia
joined by Justice Thomas sharply criticized the majority's invocation of the Lemon test despite "no
fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices" having, "in their opinions, personally driven pencils
through the creature's heart." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy, in a separate opinion agreed with Justice Scalia that "the Court's citation of Lemon v.
Kurtzman is unsettling and unnecessary." Id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). He further criticized the phrase "endorsing religion" as not "consistent with our
precedents and our traditions." Id.
35. In a series of opinions dating from the mid-1980's, Justice O'Connor has refined the threepart test originally articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) into a two-part inquiry:
"whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute (or action) actually
conveys a message of endorsement." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor J.,
concurring). The test is "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the (challenged action) ... would perceive it as a state endorsement of
(religion)." Id. at 76. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). It should be noted that Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in
Widmar in which he rejected the majority's upholding the student group's right to equal access to
university facilities "for the purposes of worship and the practice of their religion." Id. at 289
(White, J., dissenting). Primarily, Justice White rejected the majority's proposition that religious
worship is a form of speech and thereby protected under the Free Speech Clause. On the contrary,
he viewed the right asserted by the students as arguably grounded in the Free Exercise Clause but
rejected this claim as the regulation merely placed a minimal burden on their "ability freely to
exercise their religious beliefs and practices." Id. at 288. In view of Justice White's analysis in
Widmar, his willingness to rely on the Free Speech Clause in Lamb's Chapel can only be explained
by drawing a distinction between the religiously-related conduct represented in the two cases; Widmar
was arguably more akin to religious worship per se while Lamb's Chapel was more akin to speech
on a general theme but from a religious perspective.
37. Id. at 265 n.2.
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to have repudiated that standard in favor of Justice Kennedy's "test of
coercion."3
Moreover, Justice White failed to mention Mergens 9 in which the use
of school facilities during school hours for religious group meetings run
by students would pose an even greater danger that both the public and
students might perceive official endorsement of religion. The Court's
distinction in Mergens between public and private speech, that is, between
"government speech endorsing religion which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion which the Free Speech ...
Claus[e] protect[s]," 4 could have provided support for the majority's
conclusions under the Establishment Clause in Lamb's Chapel. The government's denial of access to private speech endorsing religion demonstrates "hostility" toward religion. As the Court stated in Mergens,
"secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand
that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. ' 41 Surely neither students nor the
public will likely interpret private religious speech by a non-school related
group during non-school hours as officially endorsed religious speech.
The Court's near summary disposition of the Establishment Clause
defense in Lamb's Chapel warrants further discussion than the scope of
this analysis permits.42 Perhaps the interpretive perspectives among the

38. Justice Kennedy has articulated a narrower inquiry based on two principles. The first principle
precludes the government from giving "direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact
establishes a [state] religion or, religious faith or tends to do so." Mergens v. Westside Community
Bd. of Educ., 496 U.S. 226, 260 (1991) (Kennedy J., concurring) (quoting County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part)). The second principle is that "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so."' Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). As of 1989, Justices Kennedy, White, and Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed that coercion should be the "sole touchstone" of Establishment Clause
violations, "for it would be difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of more
or less subtle coercion." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). More recently, however, the latter three along with
Justice Thomas have questioned the details of the test, particularly the "psychocoercion" spin placed
upon it in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). On the other side in Weisman, Justices Blackmun, Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor
rejected the coercion test. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Proof of government coercion
is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation"); Id. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring)
("Our precedents . . . simply cannot, however, support the position that a showing of coercion is
necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim"). Justice Souter went so far as to maintain
that "a literal application of the coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a virtual
nullity." Id. at 2673. Nevertheless, while Lee v. Weisman appeared to signal the "death of Lemon
and the adoption of a coercion test" (see Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992
SuP. CT. REv. 123, 131), both Lamb's Chapel and Zobrest seem to defy that conclusion.
39. 496 U.S. 226 (1991).
40. Id. at 250.
41. Id. An explicit distinction between the facts of Lamb's Chapel and those of Mergens would
have further permitted Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter in Mergens, to implicitly reconcile his
differing positions in the two cases. In Mergens, he criticized the majority for discussing Establishment
Clause concerns too lightly and for getting "perilously close to an outright command to allow
organized prayer ... on school premises." Id. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. The Court's reluctance or institutional inability to develop a coherent Establishment Clause
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Justices are so diverse that the majority was straining to find a common
denominator among them. Perhaps the Court was exercising jurisprudential restraint, fearful of spinning analytic threads that courts and
litigants might subsequently weave into the fabric of related cases. An
elaborate discussion by the Court of Widmar and particularly Mergens
could have had broad implications for the right claimed by students to
engage in religious speech on school grounds, an issue that has become
increasingly controversial in school districts across the country. The strong
ideological and doctrinal disagreements among the Justices on Establishment Clause doctrine, together with the complexity and political volatility
of church-state issues, the broad implications of religious speech on school
premises, and the unsettled thematic permutations that are working their
way up through the lower federal courts are all factors that obviously
weighed on the side of caution, brevity, and ambiguity.
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE: THE PERILS OF CATEGORICAL
THINKING
The lower courts and the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel all relied
on public forum doctrine in reaching divergent conclusions. The Supreme
Court's obvious and curious avoidance of the "limited public forum"
concept, as well as its strained and arguably result-oriented effort to
uphold the free speech claims asserted within the framework of existing
theory was evidenced in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), decided
less than two weeks following Lamb's Chapel. The 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist
relies only implicitly on the Lemon test and avoids any direct discussion of the more recently refined
"endorsement test" or the "coercion test." Here the Court upheld the proposition that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a school district from furnishing a disabled student enrolled
in a religiously affiliated school with a sign-language interpreter. The majority particularly relied
on Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding tuition tax deductions) and Witters v. Washington
Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1091 (1986) (upholding
vocational education assistance, as part of a general state program, to a blind student enrolled in
a private Christian college in preparation for the ministry). The key factors drawn from these cases
included the broad spectrum of beneficiaries and the fact that the funds would become available
to sectarian schools only through private choices of aid recipients. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467. fn
a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Souter and in part by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, Justice
Blackmun distinguished both Mueller and Witters from the facts at hand ("Those cases dealt with
the payment of cash or a tax deduction, where governmental involvement ended with the disbursement
of funds or lessening of tax"). Id. at 2474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun avoided
explicit reliance on Lemon or any other "test" although the language of the opinion appears to
draw from a refined Lemon test. Supra notes 34-35. His discussion of the dangers of religious
indoctrination which flow from the state provision of a human being as compared to mere funds
echoes more recent cases applying elements of Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test. ("But the
graphic symbol of the concert of church and state that results when a public employee or instrumentality mouths a religious message is likely to 'enlist-at least in the eyes of impressionable
youngsters-the powers of government to the support of the religious denomination operating the
school"') (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)). "[T]he union of
church and state in pursuit of a common enterprise is likely to place the imprimatur of governmental
approval upon the favored religion, conveying a message of exclusion to all those who do not
adhere to its tenets." Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in
a separate dissent, agreed with Justice Blackmun that the case should be remanded for consideration
of threshold statutory and regulatory problems but she declined to address the Establishment Clause
issue which she deemed as "hypothetical" given the alternative grounds for decision. Id. at 2475
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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law, highlight some of the limitations inherent in public forum analysis.
To understand those limitations, a brief discussion of the doctrine's
theoretical underpinnings and its evolution through case law would prove
useful. The public forum doctrine is a theoretical construct which has
grown over six decades and far out of proportion to its original scope
or intent. The concept of the public forum originated in the 1930s. In
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,43 Justice Roberts recognized that "streets and parks ... have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions."" The phrase "public forum" itself is attributed to Harry Kalven's classic article, "The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana."' 41 According to Kalven:
[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public
places are an important facility for public discussion and political
process ... they are in brief a public forum that th6 citizen can
the generosity and empathy with which such facilities
commandeer;
are made available
is an index of freedom."6
Initially, the concept of the public forum was intended to be speech
protective. Whether the concept was intended to establish a system of
categorizing public property in order to define access rights for expressive
purposes is less certain. Nevertheless, over the past fifty years, the Court
has traveled a winding course that has ultimately led to its current
articulation of a doctrine that has47 attracted widespread criticism4 and
concern among legal commentators and among various Justices.

43. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
44. Id. at 515.
45. 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (1965).
46. Id. at 11-12
47. David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IowA L. RE,. 143, 145, 202
(1992) ("Although the Supreme Court's 'public forum doctrine' was once a speech-protective methodology, the Burger and Rehnquist courts have converted it into a speech-restrictive methodology
[t]he problem is that the Court's application of the modern forum doctrine blindly trusts the
[..
intentions of governmental officials. This is a fatal flaw."); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the
Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. Rav. 949, 980 ("[In this area, the Court's analytic
machinery has broken down ....");LAWRENCE TRIE, A1mtEscA CoNsTrrtrroNA. LAW 987 (2d
ed. 1988) ("[M]any recent cases illustrate the blurriness, the occasional artificiality, and the frequent
irrelevance, of the categories within the public forum classification."); Robert C. Post, Between
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. Rv.
1713, 1715 (1987) ("The doctrine has in fact become a serious obstacle not only to sensitive first
amendment analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation of the government's requirements in controlling
its own property."); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return
to Formalism, 7 CxRozo L. 1Ev. 335, 341 (1986) ("The Court's current approach produces
incoherent results untouched by the interplay of considerations that should inform its decisionmaking
under the first amendment."); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems
in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 109, 110 (1986) (Public forum doctrine as
a conceptual approach, yields "an inadequate jurisprudence of labels .... In its application,
"free speech values tend to be minimized or ignored; government interests tend to be emphasized
and exaggerated."); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1223 (1984)
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Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, the Court gradually

developed the public forum doctrine, advancing and retreating on its
course. 49 One Supreme Court case is particularly noteworthy for its

influence on later development of the public forum doctrine. In Grayned

v. City of Rockford, ° Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority, pro-

posed a unified approach that has gained popularity among a number
of commentators. 5 According to the Grayned Court, "the right to use
a public place for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty
reasons." Although government can impose "reasonable time, place and
manner regulations" on all public property, such regulations must further

("Even when public forum analysis is irrelevant to the outcome of a case, the judicial focus on
the public forum concept confuses the development of first amendment principles.")
48. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text. For earlier criticism, see Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 859, 860 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe notion of 'public forum' has never
been the touchstone of public expression, for a contrary approach blinds the Court to any possible
accommodation of First Amendment values ....
[T]here is a need for a flexible approach.");
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("In focusing on the public forum issue, the Court disregards the First Amendment's central
proscription against censorship, in the form of viewpoint discrimination, in any forum, public or
non-public."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 820 (1985)
(Blackmun, J. dissenting) ("[Tihe public forum, limited-public-forum, and non-public forum categories
are but analytical shorthand for the principles that have guided the Court's decisions regarding
claims to access to public property for expressive activity. The interests served by the expressive
activity must be balanced against the interests served by the uses for which the property was intended
and the interests of all citizens to enjoy the property."); Id. at 833. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
am somewhat skeptical about the value of this analytical approach in the actual decisional process
....
At least in this case, I do not find the precise categorization of the forum particularly helpful
in reaching a decision."); U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I
have questioned whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent cases, serves
to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.").
49. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1020 (1967) (upholding
the convictions of students who had been arrested for trespass on the grounds of a county jail.)
The Court seemingly distinguished between the proprietary and non-proprietary control of government
property: "The United States Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own
property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." Id. at 48; Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (declaring that advertising space on public transportation facilities was
not a public forum and therefore access could be denied to political advertisements). Justice Blackmun,
in a plurality opinion, stated that access to public property depends on "the nature of the forum
and the conflicting interests involved .... " Id. at 302; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(upholding the denial of a request by political candidates to distribute campaign literature and hold
meetings in the public areas of a military post). The Court stated that "The notion that federal
military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as a place for free
public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is . . . historically and constitutionally false." Id. at 838.
50. 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding a municipal ordinance prohibiting "the making of any noise
or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order" of a school class while
"on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is
in session .... " Id. at 107-08).
51. See Werhan, supra note 47, at 378-84, 423-24; Barbara S. Gaal, Note, A. Unitary Approach
to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 14351 (1982); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 93-94 (1987);
Ronald A. Cass, First Amendment Access to Government Facilities, 65 VA. L. REV. 1287, 131718 (1979); Kenneth L. Karst, Public Enterpriseand the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OMO ST. L.J. 247, 261-62 (1976); Marianne Elizabeth Dixon,
Comment, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The Failure of the Public,
Forum Doctrine to Protect Free Speech, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 437, 462 (1993).
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"significant government interests." '5 2 In determining reasonableness, the
"crucial question" is one of "compatibility." That is, "whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity
must be
of a particular place at a particular time . . . . [T]he regulation
53
narrowly tailored to further the state's legitimate interest.
The unitary approach in Grayned was at best an aberration from a
straight line of cases drawing on categorization. 5 4 Two cases from the
1980s represent the Court's clearest articulation of the public forum
doctrine as it is presently applied. The language of these cases and its
subsequent application reveal a startling transformation of the public
forum. The public forum evolved from a mere concept which recognized
the important role played by public places in furthering First Amendment
values to a rigidly applied set of categorical rules which cover not only
access by the general public to government property, but also the use
of government property for expressive purposes by those who already
enjoy rightful access such as students. The doctrine, in its present form,
also suggests how the original balance has shifted from protecting the
rights of individual speech to the protection of governmental discretion.
The essential feature of the public forum doctrine established in Perry
Education Association v. Perry" and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc. 56 is a categorical framework for determining
the extent of permissible governmental regulation of expressive activity
on publicly owned property. Based upon the character of the property
and its intended use, this test delineates three categories of government
property. The first category is the "traditional" or "quintessential" public
forum, that is, localities which "by long tradition or by government fiat
[have] been devoted to assembly and debate ' 57 such as streets, sidewalks,
and parks. At these places government "may not prohibit all communicative activity" while it can "enforce a content-based exclusion" providing the exclusion is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
... is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ' 58 Reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions are permissible so long as they are "contentneutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,
and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." 9

52. 408 U.S. 104, 115.
53. Id. at 116-17.
54. The very same day that the Court decided Grayned, the Court did an abrupt about-face,
applying the "public forum" concept in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972). Here the Court declared unconstitutional a Chicago ordinance that prohibited picketing or
demonstrating "on a public way" within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building
while the school was in session. The ordinance exempted "peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute." Id. at 92-93. "Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some
groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone."
Id. at 96.
55. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
56. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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The second category of government property is the "designated" or
"limited public forum" created when government has, by policy or
practice, 60 purposefully opened property for use by the general public,
6
for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain topics. '
Government is not required to create or to maintain access to this limited
public forum. Once it does permit access, however, the government must
afford the same protection as in the traditional public forum, but only
as to speech that is of the same character as that originally designated
for protection by the government. In other words, in the designated or
limited public forum, government has broad discretion to grant access
to certain speakers and topics among which it cannot discriminate as to
the content of speech.
Other speakers and speech topics not designated for inclusion or access
fall into the third category, the non-public forum. This category includes
property that is not traditionally open for communicative purposes. With
regard to such property, a standard of mere "reasonableness" is applied.
Government restrictions on speech are permissible so long as they are
"reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpointneutral. ' 62 Yet the government's decision '6need
not be the "most rea3
sonable or the only reasonable limitation.
The public forum doctrine is a categorical or formulaic approach that
the Court uses to reconcile constitutional rights and government interests.
More specifically, it is a form of definitional balancing whereby the
Court balances the weight of the right against the state interest at the

60. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. The original concept of what has been termed the "transformation
principle" whereby government by an affirmative action may transform a non-public forum into
a designated public forum was developed in two 1981 Court decisions: Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), remanded, 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1981), and
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Heffron, the Court, applying the heightened scrutiny
used to examine content-neutral regulations restricting access to the traditional public forum upheld
the validity of a regulation requiring all persons seeking to use a fairgrounds to do so only from
fixed locations. While the fairground was not a traditional public forum, the state's invitation to
the general public to use it for certain purposes transformed it into a designated forum where
heightened scrutiny would apply. The Court established this concept more clearly in Widmar. Having
opened its facilities to student groups in general, the university could not deny access to religious
groups absent a compelling governmental interest. Subsequently, the Court in Cornelius clarified
the distinction between limited and non-public forums as turning on intent, looking to "the policy
or practice of government" as well as the "nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity to discern the government's intent." 473 U.S. at 802. The Cornelius spin on the
designated or limited public forum has been roundly criticized for eroding the strength of Widmar's
holding. See Buchanan, supra note 47, at 972. ("[I]n an accordion-like fashion, a government, if
acting, reasonably, may expand or contract at will the boundaries of the invited class on the basis
of the subject matter of the proffered speech ....
In this context, the transformation principle
loses all conceptual force."); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARv. U. REv. 120, 206
(1985) ("The Cornelius decision is an unfortunate development in public forum doctrine because it
will increase the amount of speech vulnerable to government regulation."); Post, supra note 47, at
1757 ("If a limited public forum is neither more nor less than what the government intends to be,
then a first amendment right to access to the forum is nothing more than the claim that the
government should be required to do what it already intends to do in any event.").
61. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. In determining governmental purpose, the Court may also examine
"the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity." Id. at 802.
62. Id. at 806.
63. Id. at 808.
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macro level and applies the result to all future casesfr Commonly used
in First Amendment analysis, such formulaic approaches are considered
to be generally speech protective. The formulas add objectivity and
predictability to the decisionmaking process,6 5 limiting the exercise of
judicial discretion 66 while at the same time preserving individual and
governmental
interests in the context of the broader constitutional struc67
ture.
Despite these apparent benefits, one need look no further than Lamb's
Chapel and other recent school-related cases to discover the flaws in
both the general approach and the specific public forum doctrine. Not
only are free speech values undermined within such an analytic framework,
but predictability and objectivity are achieved at the expense of specificity
and fairness. 6 All government interests are uniformly treated as "vital"
in all cases within a particular category. 69 While rules or categories may
constrain judges from substituting their own preferences for those of
government officials, they also dictate certain outcomes regardless of
specific facts. 70 The Court gives primary consideration to the interests of
governmental decisionmakers and assesses these interests independently
71
of and 'prior to the resolution of a case itself.
More fundamentally, as the category of "designated" or "limited public
forum" so clearly indicates, rigid interpretations of constitutional rights
have the dangerous potential of placing almost unbridled discretion in
the hands of government officials when defining the limits of those rights.
As Lamb's Chapel clearly demonstrates, where so much discretion is
given to government officials, a forum can be defined ostensibly in terms
of speakers or topics thus excluding views that government finds offensive
or undesirable. This process defies constitutional doctrine and plain common sense. If the freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights are intended
to serve as constraints on governmental abuse of authority, how can the
Court justify a doctrine that permits government
to decide whether it
72
chooses to be subject to such constraint?
There are numerous questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court's
most recent wanderings through the labyrinth of the public forum doctrine.
Should there exist, perhaps, a presumptive duty on the part of government
to provide equal access for expressive purposes to property within its

64. David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1521, 1556 (1992).
65. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (1989).
66. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAro.
L. REv. 265, 300 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 543 (1988).
67. Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755, 777 (1963).
68. C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
'Special Contexts', 56 U. CiNN. L. REV. 779, 837 (1988).
69. Id. at 785.
70. C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review in the
Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 343, 388 (1988).
71. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 210 (1985).
72. Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 55 ALB. L. REV. 713, 722-23 (1992).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

control? 7" As Lamb's Chapel points out, is there a clear distinction between
content-based discrimination which is permissible in the non-public forum
and viewpoint discrimination which is impermissible. It is unclear under
which rubric a blanket prohibition against religious speech would lie.
Perhaps courts should not apply the public forum doctrine to cases
involving student speech where the speakers do not seek access to the
property but merely seek to use it for private or personal speech.74 Or
perhaps the applicability of public forum analysis should turn on the
question of government sponsorship.
Is the concept of "viewpoint neutrality" applicable to public schooling
where school officials regularly select certain views or perspectives that
further the inculcation of societal and community values? Should school
officials have discretion to discriminate against viewpoints in curriculumrelated or school-sponsored activities while maintaining viewpoint neutrality with regard to "private" student speech that happens to occur
on school grounds? Should this distinction be applied to religious viewpoints? Should all viewpoints be granted equal access even in the nonpublic forum or should religious viewpoints be afforded "preferred"
status? What about speech that conveys views that are morally reprehensible to the larger society such as those espoused by the Ku Klux
Klan or neo-Nazi groups? Or views that violate constitutional norms,
such as those that promote racial or religious intolerance, or the subjugation of women? Is government permitted to favor a particular point
of view on an issue of public concern, such as abstinence versus condom
distribution or family planning services versus abortion counseling, when
the context of the public issue is the allocation of public resources and
not access to public property? 7" These are just a sampling of the questions
left open for future debate on this topic.

73. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1137, 1205-06 (1983).
74. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1986) ("[Plublic forum analysis is irrelevant
when access is not at issue. When citizens are going about their business in a place they are entitled
to be, they are presumptively entitled to speak."). But see DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools,
799 F. Supp. 744, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
foregoing "commentator did not have Hazelwood available to him when he suggested the use/access
distinction, and the Supreme Court's analysis in Hazelwood defies this categorization") (referring
to Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), cited infra notes 77-99 and accompanying
text).
75. In a 1991 case, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), the Court rejected the argument
that 1988 regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services under Title
X of the Public Health Service Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-41, discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint. The regulations prohibited private health care organizations receiving Title X funds
from providing "counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning," 42
C.F.R. 59.8(a)(1) (1989), nor could recipients engage in activities that "encourage, promote or
advocate abortion as a method of family planning." 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a). The Court here distinguished between the refusal to fund and the imposition of a penalty:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program
to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at
the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem
in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis
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IMPLICATIONS FOR STUDENT SPEECH
Lamb's Chapel is not typically a "schools' case." In Lamb's Chapel,
claims to expressive access were asserted by non-students seeking to use
the facilities after school hours for non school-related purposes. The
usual arguments touching on the mission of public schooling and curriculum-relatedness were irrelevant. Without the complicated "educational
baggage" issue, the narrow fact pattern formed the basis of a good test
case through which religious speech advocates could incrementally develop
the right to religious expression on public school grounds from the public
law litigation perspective. From a policy perspective, however, the case
did not allow the Court the opportunity to address directly the various
school-related issues of religious speech which are now facing lower courts
and school administrators nationwide. Nevertheless, both the holding and
rationale of Lamb's Chapel carry potentially serious implications for the
exercise of religious and non-religious speech by students attending public
schools.
The Lamb's Chapel Court's affirmation of Widmar's holding that
religious speech is protected under the First Amendment Free Speech
Clause was good news to students seeking to engage in non schoolsponsored religious expression. In fact, the Lamb's Chapel Court went
beyond Widmar in holding that even in the non-public forum, at least
when addressing a broad topic of general interest, the essential distinction
between religious and non-religious speech is based on the speaker's
viewpoint, and this viewpoint must be granted equal access. Lamb's
Chapel also demonstrates that the Court as an institution may be leaning
toward an accommodationist approach to religious speech under the
Establishment Clause. The failure of the Justices to formulate a solid
rationale supporting these propositions and the majority's thinly reasoned
opinion leave open the question as to whether a different result might
be achieved if, for example, the issue were voluntary non-sponsored
student speech during the school day and outside the context of religious
group meetings.
More fundamentally, the most troubling aspect of Lamb's Chapel is
the Court's continued reliance on the public forum doctrine. As currently
applied in the school setting, public forum analysis grants school authorities almost unrestricted discretion in defining the permissible parameters of student speech. Even if Lamb's Chapel's prohibition against
religious viewpoint discrimination were carried over to student speech,
sponsored or not, there is a dark side to this. Lamb's Chapel is a case
which addressed equal access and not access per se. The Court's decision
granted religious speakers the right to express themselves so long as

of viewpoint.
Rust, 111 S.Ct. at 1772. But see Justice Blackmun's dissent, "These [regulations] are clearly
restrictions aimed at the suppression of 'dangerous ideas."' Id. at 1781 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The question remains as to whether Rust and Lamb's Chapel are reconcilable. The argument can
be made that the "anti-abortion" position is generally associated with particular religiously affiliated
groups so that the regulations in question favor a religious viewpoint over what may be considered
a secular viewpoint on the topic of family planning.
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government officials had granted such rights to similar speakers or topics.
In other words, the right to engage in religious speech does not exist by
itself, but rather is derivative of similar rights granted to non-religious
speakers in the relevant forum.
In the limited public forum, school officials may still open or close
the forum at will to a specific type of speaker or topic which they find
disagreeable. The Lamb's Chapel opinion, therefore, may create built-in
incentives for even well-intentioned school officials to further limit expressive rights. For example, school officials may decide to shut out
certain "acceptable" speakers, topics, or perspectives in order to avoid
"unacceptable" ones such as those grounded in religion, so that the
school can maintain control over the ideas expressed on school property.
The school may also decide to shut out speech to avoid controversy. If
these scenarios were to occur, it would narrow the universe of permissible
speech on government property and seemingly violate fundamental First
Amendment values. 6 Moreover, in the non-public forum, which has
proven to be the most commonly identified forum in public education
cases, the doctrine will continue to invite courts to accept any pedagogically
related justification for limiting speech.
In fact, public forum analysis has effectively disengaged the courts
from the public dialogue over school governance, the permissible ends
of public schooling, First Amendment values, and the interrelationship
among these essential features underlying free speech claims in the school
setting. The Court's failure to articulate a coherent theory of expressive
use of government property, particularly school property, has sent the
lower courts into a tailspin of confusion perpetuated by the Lamb's
Chapel decision.
This confusion in school-related cases stems in part from Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,77 the Court's 1988 decision upholding the
authority of school officials to regulate the content of a student newspaper.
In Hazelwood, the Court concluded that the school had not created a
designated public forum in the school newspaper either by policy or
practice. School officials could restrict "the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' '78 The majority
opinion, written by Justice White, also the spokesperson for the Lamb's
76. Over the years, constitutional scholars have advanced a number of values that arguably
underlie the First Amendment. Included among these are the search for truth (LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577 (1st ed. 1978), quoting Justice Holmes dissent in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919): "[tjhe best test of the truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market"); the protection of intelligent self-government

and political participation

(ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM

27 (1960)); the promotion

of self-realization and self-fulfillment (MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 4-5 (1984); C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47 (1989)); the promotion of tolerance
and diversity (LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 11 (1986)); and as a check on the abuse
of governmental power (Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 527, 528).
77. 484 U.S. 260 (1988), remanded, 840 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of Hazelwood
and its impact on students' expressive rights, see Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School
Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253 (1992).
78. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
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Chapel majority, opens with a reaffirmation of students' expressive rights
as articulated more than two decades before in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.7 9 The Hazelwood opinion notes,
however, the limitations placed upon First Amendment rights "in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment. "80 Drawing a
clear distinction between toleration and promotion of student speech, the
Court held that, unlike the symbolic speech in Tinker which was also
political in nature, the publication of student articles in Hazelwood
required the school not merely to tolerate speech, but to "lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of student expression."''" The Court
defined the distinction as follows:
[Toleration] addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises .... [Promotion] concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they
occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.1 2
The Court's sweeping language goes far beyond the narrow issue of
newspaper censorship. The opinion grants school officials broad discretion
to control or limit student speech, including situations where students
are exposed to material that is "inappropriate for their particular maturity
level," where students would be subjected to expression that could be
"erroneously attributable to the school," and where the proposed speech
is "ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, [or] biased
or prejudiced." 83 Since Hazelwood, lower courts have struggled to apply
its analysis to a broad range of student speech, both curricular and noncurricular. These permutations on Hazelwood underscore the limitations
of the public forum doctrine, particularly when the doctrine is applied
to the many activities represented in public schools.
Unlike Tinker's expansive view of student expressive rights on school
grounds, Hazelwood focused on a more narrow unit of analysis, a school
newspaper, and applied public forum analysis only to that "medium"
of expression. Lower courts subsequently have adopted this approach
and have continued to define the forum in question narrowly in terms
of the "medium" of expression such as school-sponsored newspapers,

79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In striking down a school's prohibition against students' wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam War, the Court held that school officials may limit free expression
only where it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others." Id.at 513.
80. 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
81. Id. at 272-73.
82. Id. at 271.
83. Id.
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"underground" newspapers, the school yearbook, or athletic programs.
Courts have also defined the public forum in terms of the "locus" of
expression, such as speech made in hallways, classrooms or the cafeteria.
The debate and inconsistent results reached in the lower courts have
revolved primarily around the question of whether the Hazelwood standard, with its reliance on the public forum doctrine, applies only to
curriculum-related speech, to all school-sponsored speech, or to all speech
by students on school facilities whether school-sponsored or not.
Several post-Hazelwood cases addressing the issue of religious speech,
particularly the distribution of religious literature, demonstrate the disparate interpretations of Hazelwood rendered by the lower courts in
addressing this question.8 Although these cases have subtle factual distinctions, the degree to which each opinion embraces or rejects public
forum analysis, the underlying rationale, the selection of relevant precedent, and the results are worthy of note.
The post-Hazelwood case law can be grouped into two categories. In
the first category of cases, the lower federal courts have explicitly embraced
public forum analysis. For example, in Nelson v. Moline School District
40,85 students seeking to distribute a nondenominational newspaper called
Issues and Answers challenged the school's policy. Here a district court
in Illinois held that school hallways and classrooms were non-public fora.
As a result, Nelson permits school officials to impose reasonable regulations that preserve the use for which the school has been lawfully
dedicated, that is, teaching "fundamental values of public school education. ' '86 Distribution of the same publication provoked a similar controversy in Hemry v. School Board. 7 The court concluded that school

84. For a discussion of this question outside the context of religious speech, see Burch v. Barker,
861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988). Here the Ninth Circuit focused on Hazelwood's sponsorship standard
in striking down a blanket policy requiring prior approval of all student written material prior to
distribution on school premises or at school functions. Student editors of an unauthorized newspaper
challenged the policy. The appeals panel drew the distinction, drawn by the Supreme Court in
Hazelwood, between the school's toleratingstudent speech (as in Tinker) and the school's affirmatively
promoting particular student speech (as in Hazelwood). Id. at 1158. The court applied the Tinker
standard, concluding that school officials could not subject non school-sponsored material to reg.... "
ulation "on the basis of undifferentiated fears of possible disturbances or embarrassment
Cir.
935
(9th
F.2d
887
Dist.,
School
County
Id. at 1159. But see Planned Parenthood v. Clark
1989), aff'd 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). A different panel of the Ninth Circuit, the
following year, applied public forum analysis to non-curricular related activities, upholding a school
district's refusal to publish Planned Parenthood advertisements in the high school newspaper,
yearbook, and athletic event programs. Citing Hazelwood, the court held that schools must be
entitled to disassociate themselves from speech that is inconsistent with their mission, even when
the program's purpose is extra-curricular. Id. at 943.
85. 725 F. Supp. 965 (C.D. Il1. 1989). The school's policy permitted students to distribute nonschool-sponsored materials only in designated areas of the school (excluding the halls and classrooms),
before and after school and during lunch, and anywhere between classes, provided the materials
were first approved by the principal. Approval would be granted unless the materials were libelous,
pornographic or obscene, or pervasively indecent or vulgar; invaded the privacy of others; or would
cause material and substantial disruption.
86. Id. at 974.
87. 760 F. Supp. 856 (D. Colo. 1991). The policy prohibited the distribution of "any student
publication which .. .[c]reates a material and substantial disruption of the normal school activity."
Id. at 858. As applied by the principal, the policy prohibited the distribution of non-school-related
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hallways were neither a public forum nor a limited public forum because
the school had not designated the hallways to be used indiscriminately
by the public. According to the court, the restriction was merely a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation that had been "applied
equally to those seeking non-school related distribution" in the school."
More recently, in Hedges v. Wauconda Community Unit School District
118,19 an Illinois district court addressed the constitutionality of a school
policy that imposed restrictions on the distribution of materials not
primarily prepared by students as well as materials concerning "activities,
or meetings of a non-school sponsored organization. ' ' 9 Here the court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the applicability of public forum
analysis after Hazelwood turns on the question of school sponsorship.
According to the court, Hazelwood's "very language suggests that the
Court would have applied the forum test to a restriction on speech in
any school facility." Relying on the Hazelwood opinion, the court held
that, "school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school
authorities have 'by policy or practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public, . . . or by some segment of the
public, such as student organizations. ' 91 School sponsorship came into
play "1) to determine the nature of the forum involved and 2) to explain
why censorship was permissible in this closed forum.''92 The court stated
that the junior high school was a closed forum. Nevertheless, the regulations in question were unreasonable.
These cases indicate a tendency on the part of the courts, since Hazelwood, to apply forum analysis even to non-school-sponsored speech.
There exists a second, equally credible category of cases, however, that
hold the opposite. In Rivera v. East Otero School District,93 the court
dismissed the application of public forum doctrine in a challenge to a
policy that prohibited the distribution of all material that proselytized a
particular religious or political belief. The court focused instead on the
high level of protection generally afforded religious and political speech.
District courts in Pennsylvania and Texas have also applied a similar
rationale in rejecting the applicability of public forum analysis to non
school-sponsored religious speech. In Slotterback v. Interboro School
District,9 a secondary school student challenged a school district policy

material in the school hallways in order to "facilitate the movement of students between classrooms."
Id. at 862. Materials could be distributed outside the school or could be deposited at designated
school locations.
88. Id. at 863.
89. 807 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
90. Id. at 453.
91. Id. at 459 (quoting Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988), remanded, 840 F.2d
596 (8th Cir. 1988)).
92. Id.
93. 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989). Here students were suspended for distributing copies
of Issues and Answers in violation of school policy. Id. at 1191.
94. 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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that placed a ban on "unacceptable non-school written material(s)" in9' 5
cluding those that "proselytize a particular religious or political belief."
According to the court, public forum analysis was found to be inappropriate in a case of personal speech such as this. Drawing heavily
upon Hazelwood's distinction between promotion and toleration, the court
held this fact pattern to be more akin to Tinker than to Hazelwood. It
stated that restrictions on personal speech must be narrowly tailored to
a compelling governmental interest. 96 A similar blanket ban on religious
97
speech was struck down in Clark v. Dallas Independent School District
where the court applied the Tinker standard of "material and substantial
disruption.' 98 The court held that the restricted speech consisting of
religious discussions, meetings, and the distribution of religious literature
was "voluntary, student-initiated, and free from the imprimatur of school
involvement." 99
The first category of cases applying public forum analysis generally
addresses time, place or manner regulations while the second category
examines broad-based or blanket prohibitions on religious speech. The
rationale underlying each of these decisions, however, indicates that this
distinction is irrelevant to the utilization of public forum doctrine in each
case. What is relevant is each court's interpretation of Hazelwood and
the significance of school sponsorship. The unanswered questions left by
Hazelwood and the fundamental interests at stake merit far more clarification than the Court yet has offered.
LOOKING BACK TO MOVE FORWARD
A "cautious center" developing on the Court has begun to espouse
a less formalistic and more contextual approach to constitutional interpretation, including First Amendment analysis. Justice Kennedy has specifically criticized the Court's evolution of public forum doctrine as "a
jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas"'0 stating: "It [public forum
doctrine] leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a nonspeech-related purpose for the area. ' 'l° Justice Stevens has rejected the
concept of "categories" as being "ultimately unsound" because it "fits
poorly with the complex reality of expression" and fails to "take seriously
the importance of context."' 2 Justice Souter has criticized public forum
analysis as:
stultified not only by treating its archetypes as closed categories, but
by treating its candidates so categorically as to defeat their identi95.
96.
Clause
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 285.
Id. at 291. The court did not find the school district's interest in avoiding an Establishment
violation to be sufficiently compelling. Id. at 296.
806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Texas 1992).
Id. at 120.
Id.
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (1992) (Kennedy,

J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2716 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2566 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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fication with the archetypes . .

.

.The enquiry may and must relate

to the particular property at issue and not necessarily to the precise
classification of the property . . . .To find one example of a certain
property type . . that is not a public forum is not to rule out all

properties of that sort.103

Justice O'Connor also has suggested a contextual approach, stressing that
government restrictions on speech "must be assessed in light of the purpose
of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances."'0 4
In fact, all four Justices have endorsed a unitary standard as briefly
adopted by the Court two decades ago in Grayned v. City of Rockfor 05
but which has been subsequently abandoned. During the 1991 Term, the
Court decided InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,"°
in which the four Justices concurred that the Court:
should classify as a public forum any piece of public property that
is "suitable for discourse" in its physical character, where expressive
activity is "compatible" with the use to which it has actually been
put ... The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is

basically compatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time.""1
It seems clear that at least four of the current Justices would most likely
re-engage the Court in a more fact-sensitive balancing of expressive rights
and governmental interests. Given the internal inconsistency in public
forum doctrine, its inherent dangers in capturing too broad a range of
speech in its restrictive grasp, the confusion evidenced in lower court
attempts to apply the doctrine, and the concern expressed in recent years
by a solid core of sitting Justices, the time may be ripe for the Court
to abandon the public forum concept in favor of a standard that overcomes
the rigidity of public forum analysis yet provides the maximum possible
guidance for lower courts, individual speakers, and government officials.
As a basic premise, any theory must recognize that freedom of expression is a process for achieving additional goals.108 Furthermore, expressive freedom must be framed in terms that reflect the realities of
everyday life.109 In other words, such a standard must promote a broad
range of individual and societal values underlying the First Amendment
while recognizing the responsibility of government officials to maintain
public property for its intended purpose. The standard should be unified

103. Int'l Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
105. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
106. 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992).
107. Id. at 2724.
108. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment; 72 YALE L.J.
877, 907 (1963) ("Freedom of expression . . . is a basic element in the democratic way of life ....
But it is not through this process alone that a democratic society will attain its ultimate ends. Any
theory of freedom of expression must therefore take into account other values, such as public order,
justice, equality and moral progress ....").
109. Id. at 917.
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and apply to all content-based restrictions on government controlled
property. It should eliminate the relevance of official intent in defining
the scope of protected speech, as currently recognized in the limited
public forum concept, and should diminish the distinction between content
and viewpoint-based restrictions, recognizing both restrictions as violative
of basic First Amendment principles.
In designing such an ideal standard, a look at prior First Amendment
approaches, such as Grayned's compatibility test"0 and Tinker's presumption in favor of speech,"' as well as methods and standards used
by the Court in other areas of constitutional law will prove useful. One
possibility would be a balancing test with a presumption in favor of
speech. This approach would recognize the fundamental importance of
speech to promote personal and democratic goals by shifting the burden
to government officials to demonstrate that the restrictions imposed are
narrowly tailored and necessary to promote "important" governmental
interests as opposed to "reasonable" or "legitimate" interests. Courts
should weigh in the balance the particularized governmental interests that
are actually at stake rather than abstract or hypothetical interests such
as the potential dangers of public unrest and violence as proffered by
the school officials in Lamb's Chapel or the school's general responsibility
to maintain discipline or inculcate societal values as suggested often in
student speech cases. This approach would lessen the risk of impermissibly
motivated restrictions by placing a greater burden on officials to justify
their actions rather than allow them to hide behind the veil of "reasonableness." 1 2
Such an approach would be more fact-sensitive, thus allowing flexibility
in different contexts, e.g., the military or public schooling, where unique
110. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 79. The "material and substantial disruption" test of Tinker permitted the
Court to examine independently whether the limitations on student speech were necessary to achieve
the school's serious educational objectives. The mode of analysis here was similar to that of Grayned's
compatibility test. The Court assessed whether the potential consequences of the students' speech
were incompatible with the normal functioning of the school. See Post, supra note 47, at 1773-74.
112. Motivational inquiry in a library book removal case was endorsed expressly by at least four
of the Justices in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). According to Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion (joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens), school officials violate the First Amendment if they "intended by their removal decision to deny [students] access to ideas with which [the
school board] disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in [the] decision." Id. at 871.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun agreed that "school officials may not remove books for
the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when
that action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas involved." Id. at 879-80
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Inquiry into official motives or purpose has also been applied in
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
("[T]he basic equal protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240). See also
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) ("[T]he burden [is] properly
placed upon [the plaintiff] to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a 'substantial factor' . . . in the [defendant's] decision ...

"

The defendant must

then show that "it would have reached the same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected
conduct."); Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (Discriminatory purpose "implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects .... "). First
Amendment Establishment Clause doctrine under the Lemon test and its subsequent refinements
have also used a standard of secular purpose. Supra note 34.
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and complex institutional missions demand a special balancing of individual, societal, and governmental interests. Additionally, the suggested
approach would permit courts to consider the function of the property
and the compatibility of the speech with that function while at the same
time searching the surrounding circumstances for evidence that officials
were motivated solely or primarily by hostility toward the speaker or the
message conveyed. In searching for impermissible motive, courts could
inquire as to the events leading up to the decision to limit speech, whether
the procedures departed from past practice," 3 and whether more speech
protective alternatives were available to the decisionmakers.
This approach would also establish a legal and political framework
that is not merely speech protective but also speech supportive. Although
government officials probably would exercise greater caution in limiting
expressive rights under such a standard, they might also exercise greater
discretion in permitting speech than Lamb's Chapel allowed, especially
when freed from the burden of the limited public forum concept. Government officials would no longer necessarily fear that opening a particular
"locus" or "medium" of expression to one group would serve as a
measure of intent and require granting access to all similar speakers or
topics regardless of the views expressed. Each request for access would
be examined individually in light of the surrounding circumstances, considering the function of the "locus" or "medium" and its compatibility
with the speech exercised.
This model approach is not advanced as a panacea for all the problems
inherent in current public forum doctrine. Issues remain unresolved, not
the least of which are the problems associated with assessing official or
institutional motive, the difficulty in determining which motives are permissible or impermissible in a given context, and the role of viewpointneutrality in certain settings such as schools. 1 4 Nevertheless, even though
this approach perhaps lacks the objectivity of categorization for purposes
of judicial review, this framework would permit courts to recognize that
the strengths of competing interests may vary by context thus preventing
courts from categorically dismissing certain speech claims simply because
they fall within a particular set of exclusions.

113. In the context of a Fourteenth Amendment race discrimination claim, the Court in Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), listed the following
factors that courts may consider in examining invidious discriminatory purpose: 1) the "impact of
the official action;" 2) the "historical background of the decision . . . particularly if it reveals a
series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;" 3) "[d]epartures from the normal procedural
sequence;" 4) "[slubstantive departures . . . particularly if the factors usually considered important
by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached;" and 5) the "legislative
or administrative history . . . especially where there are contemporary statements by members of
the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports."
114. For a discussion of motivational theory in constitutional law, see John Hart Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970); Paul Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT.
REV. 95; Theodore Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Symposium on Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN Dmoo
L. REv. 925 (1978).
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CONCLUSION
Lamb's Chapel may well be remembered for what the Justices failed
to say and what they could have said rather than what they actually did
say. Nevertheless, the issue of religious speech which lies at the heart
of Lamb's Chapel as well as the analytic framework of public forum
doctrine within which the Court examined that issue are both sufficiently
controversial and significant to merit close examination and continued
attention. This commentary used the facts and reasoning of Lamb's
Chapel to discredit the Court's reliance on public forum doctrine and
more importantly to suggest an alternative framework for addressing
individual rights to use governmental property for expressive purposes.
Perhaps the Court's weak reasoning in Lamb's Chapel actually reflects
a measure of caution on the part of the Justices, an institutional need
to step back, move slowly, and avoid developing doctrine any further,
at least until ideological lines are more clearly drawn and an alternative
approach is agreed upon. Until such a majority coalition takes shape,
however, lower courts will continue to tug and pull at the boundaries
of a doctrine whose relevance and applicability remain questionable,
particularly in the context of public schooling.

